

ICPP4 – Montreal 2019

Panel P07: Making ‘Credible’ Knowledge for Policy: the Politics (and Practice) of Expertise

**Please note that this is a work-in-progress based on an ongoing data collection. Please ask for permission before citing or disseminating.**

***Trust in Number-Makers – the Politics of Expertise in  
Transnational Governance of Poverty***

**Dr Justyna Bandola-Gill**

School of Social and Political Science

University of Edinburgh

Contact: [Justyna.Bandola-Gill@ed.ac.uk](mailto:Justyna.Bandola-Gill@ed.ac.uk)

This working paper is part of a project that has received funding from the European Research Council (ERC) under the European Union's Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme, under grant agreement No 715125 METRO (ERC-2016-StG) ('International Organisations and the Rise of a Global Metrological Field', 2017-2022, PI: Sotiria Grek).

**Abstract:** This paper explores the basis of the epistemic authority of experts in a production of metrics by International Organisations. The practices of quantification – increasingly central to the remit of IOs – not only impact on the way organisations operate but also create new social and political realities in which IOs are increasingly interconnected. This generative power of global measurement regimes has profound implications for the ways in which International Organisations interact and for the environments, these new interrelationships come to generate. One such change lies in the understanding of expert credibility. The canonical view of expert legitimacy linked it to objectivity and autonomy from politics. Yet, in the transnational governance such ‘epistemic gains’ (Jasanoff, 2011) stemming from the separation of facts and values are problematic as practices of quantification inherently combine moral and technical considerations. This paper, drawing on a larger ERC-funded project ‘International Organisations and the Rise of Global Metrological field’, addresses this puzzle by focusing on a case study of the collaboration of IOs in production of

sustainable development indicators. Building on this empirical exploration of expert practices relating to the production of metrics, we contribute to the interdisciplinary debates on expertise. In particular, the paper builds on Jasanoff's (2005) concept of three-body expert legitimacy. As such, we explore the notion of expert credibility in global governance by carrying out three interlinked inquiries: i) into the disciplinary and organisational backgrounds of data collectors, rankers and experts, their key competencies and epistemic framings (hence 'body of knowledge'); ii) professional standing of experts, moves of experts and expert practices between organisations ('body of an expert'); iii) the institutionalised notions of expert authority and its venues as well as organisation-wide framings of the policy issues ('body of the institution'). Combined these three lines of inquiry point to the notion of expert credibility in IOs as a negotiated and interlinked phenomenon that is constructed via navigation of competing epistemologies, value systems and interests. As such, this study contributes to the theoretical debates over expert legitimacy by exploring both its robustness and its (limited) capacity to travel across different institutional settings.

**Key words:** experts, global governance, legitimacy, knowledge infrastructure

## 1. INTRODUCTION

The global governance of complex social problems such as poverty, nutrition or the environment is becoming increasingly tantamount with establishing large statistical systems of monitoring to provide evidence for policy programmes and track progress. The ever-so-expanding infrastructure of surveillance and evaluation in the goal of exploring global challenges is best exemplified by the implementation of Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) in 2016. The SDGs are characterised by multiple levels of measurement, including goals, targets and indicators (as illustrated in Box 1). These new developments reconfigure the relationships between International Organisations who increasingly have to collaborate and coordinate their actions in order to implement the numerical agendas (Grek, 2017). This emergence of global 'metrological' field<sup>1</sup> rearrange the actors and practices of measurement, shaping the global interdependencies of actors, data infrastructures and institutions of global governance.

In the context where 'measuring' and 'governing' become increasingly close, the problem of expertise gains new traction. With the dominance of technocratic modes of legitimation of actors, decisions and programmes, the global governance is often described as 'expertocracy' (Grek, 2013)

---

<sup>1</sup> For more information about the concept of the metrological field, see: [www.metro-project.eu](http://www.metro-project.eu)

where the dominant institutional processes are ones of scientisation and economisation (Djelic & Sahlin-Andresson, 2006). The scope for expertise in global governance, shaped by the evidence-based policymaking and quantification agendas, is increasingly defined by ‘number producing’ (Scheel & Ustek-Spilda, 2019). Consequently, objectivity (established by the transparency and abstraction of numbers) emerges as the key ‘epistemic gain’ (Jasanoff, 2011) of expert epistemic authority. At the same time, scholarship in STS over the last few decades has shown that production, acceptance and contestation of knowledge are in fact political processes (Yearley, 2005). In particular, the production of numbers inherently combines the logics of science and of the state (Desrosières, 2002), interweaving technical, moral and political considerations. The strict boundary between experts (representing science) and policy context (an area of power) was the traditional source of such authority (Haas, 2004); hence, the blending notions of governance and measurement pose an important challenge to the traditionally defined structures of knowledge and power.

The central puzzle of this paper point to seemingly paradoxical grounds of expert legitimacy which is based on competing grounds of either a separation of political and technocratic considerations or – in contrary – a combination of the two. Therefore, the understanding of the legitimacy of experts and their cognitive authority in transnational governance requires an exploration of the tensions between the contextual (political) and the objective (technocratic) in expert practices. Against these theoretical considerations, this paper aims to answer three questions: (i) How is expert legitimacy constructed in international organisations? (ii) In what ways experts combine technocratic and political considerations when producing numbers? (iii) How portable is expertise in the international context? The paper explores these questions in the context of poverty measurement by the World Bank and UNICEF by focusing on the changing meanings and practices resulting from the introduction of SDGs.

By exploring the theoretical considerations regarding the politics of expertise in the context of global poverty monitoring, this paper makes a two-fold contribution to the literature. Firstly, it argues that international expertise is determined and shaped by the process at the epistemic (knowledge base), personal (expert practices) and organisational (knowledge infrastructure) levels. Secondly, it shows that the relationship between scientific and political modes of legitimising experts are neither completely separated nor combined, but rather symbiotic and malleable.

## **2. KEY MEDIATING CONCEPTS AND A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK**

### **2.1. The epistemic authority of experts**

As indicated in the introduction to this paper, the epistemic authority of experts lies on contradictory grounds. On the one hand, the authority of experts was traditionally derived from the autonomy of experts (Price, 1968; Wildavsky, 1979). The ability to ‘speak truth to power’ (Wildavsky, 1979; Haas, 2004) was derived from the assumption that facts (‘truth’) and values (‘power’) are separated, hence experts base their ability to make an assessment on separation from the political considerations. On the other hand, the hybridisation of social institutions and the increasing blurring of the boundaries between science and policy has reconfigured the relationships of the authority of experts. The supposition behind this emerging literature on knowledge production science is effective in policy when it is responsive to users’ needs (Gibbons et al., 1994), hence allowing for combining scientific, political and pragmatic considerations (Funtowicz & Ravetz, 1993). These models of knowledge production assume close collaboration between academics and policymaking actors, allowing for contextualised consideration of the best evidence – or production of evidence in the context of the application (Gibbons et al., 1994; Nowotny et al., 2001). By engaging a broader range of actors, these approaches have the potential to achieve greater transparency regarding normative presumptions of knowledge which have thus far been veiled in the garb of the objectivity of scientific facts (Jasanoff, 1990, 2003). Therefore, the main source of authority moves from the objectivity of knowledge (for example as projected via standardised scientific practice) towards its applicability for solving policy problems and its wider social legitimacy (Nowotny et al., 2001). Therefore, the sources of epistemic authority of experts are more distributed and reliant on the multiplicity of stakeholders with diverging relations of proximity to policy.

Consequently, this epistemic multiplicity of science-policy relationship requires a reconfiguration of the technical capacity of experts as well as their social capital in policy and academia. For example, Cash et al. (2003) outlined three central qualities of research in decision-making: credibility, legitimacy and saliency. Credibility, as argued by Cash et al. (2003), is assessed by a “proxy” of the scientific process (which assumes that the knowledge is produced on the basis of science rather than interest), participants (expertise), and organisations who are engaged (judged by past success). Therefore, the evidence is considered credible when it is seen as adhering to the norms of scientific knowledge production. Legitimacy, however, refers to the broader acceptability of evidence by the end users, for example through its alignment with the values, perspectives and concerns of the broader social environment in which the expert advice is being given. As summarised by Belcher et al. (2016, p. 12): “Whereas credibility refers to technical aspects of sound research, legitimacy deals with socio-political aspects of the knowledge production process and products of research”.

The concept of credibility of evidence is to a degree characterised by its circularity, as the credibility of the researcher lends credibility to evidence (Conrandriopoulos et al., 2010; Mitton et al., 2007), but also, evidence might lend credibility to different participants in the knowledge-into-policy process (for example practitioners; see McCabe et al., 2015). At the same time, the former process seems to be more salient, as the validity of evidence and the credibility of the conveyor of knowledge are not always related (Conrandriopoulos et al., 2010). This is because the process of assigning credibility is inherently social rather than purely scientific (Hilgartner, 2000; Jasanoff, 1990).

## **2.2. Expertise as institutionalised and encultured**

The assigned value of expertise stems from the symbolic standing of different types of knowledge and the selection of those which are recognised as having more value in society (Arnoldi, 2007). Hence, the expertise is “relational” (Grundmann, 2017, p. 26) in the sense that it involves negotiation between experts and the recipients of the expert advice. This line of inquiry – positing that expertise is constructed by the social environment, rather than based solely on inherent qualities of experts is summarised by Sheila Jasanoff:

expertise is not merely something that is in the heads and hands of skilled persons, constituted through their deep familiarity with the problem in question, but rather that it is something acquired, and deployed, within particular historical, political, and cultural contexts. (Jasanoff, 2003, p. 393)

Accordingly, STS scholarship highlights the contingency of expertise and its underdetermined, historically bounded character (Arnoldi, 2007; Epstein, 1995; Turner, 2010). In other words, expertise is not a singular, objective characteristic but rather a multifaceted, institutionally and culturally determined concept. Consequently, different institutional settings would produce different configurations of expert status and authority. As argued by Jasanoff (2005), the problem of expertise might be explored by looking at it a ‘three-body problem’ where the body of knowledge, the body of an expert and a body of an institution through which expert advice is being given. By this conceptual distinction, Jasanoff points to the centrality of epistemic and institutional determinants through which expertise is being assigned and mobilised, including the information underpinning the advice, personal standing and perceived merit of experts and institutional setting of the advisory body.

## **2.3. Analytical framework**

These two strands of literature – discussing the sources of epistemic authority of experts and discussing the social determinants of expertise, point to a complex interplay between the mechanisms of technocratic legitimacy (establishing the power of objectivity of experts) and mechanisms of contextualised embedding of expertise (guaranteeing relevance and democratic and political authority of experts). Combining these two insights outlines a research agenda that explores the interaction between scientific and political in the practices of experts as determined by processes occurring on three levels (building on Jasanoff, 2005): epistemic, individual and institutional (see: Figure 1).

The proposed analytical framework posits that understanding of expert legitimacy and their epistemic authority requires an exploration of three themes: (i) the understanding of the knowledge production practices by experts, (ii) the understanding of positioning of experts within and across the institutions; (iii) organisation-wide notions of expert authority and its venues as well as organisation-wide framings of the policy issues. As such, the proposed framework argues that expert authority goes beyond the individualised politics of specific actors and their claims to epistemic authority, but rather requires an exploration of ‘construction of the machineries of knowledge construction’ (Knorr -Cetina, 2007, p. 363).




Figure 1. The determinants of expert legitimacy.

Firstly, the scope and format of expertise are determined by the epistemic qualities of knowledge produced by the experts. The central role of experts in policymaking is often discussed in both academic and public debates lie in their ability to produce objective evidence. The notion of objectivity in this context entails both the scientific reliability of evidence (Montuschi, 2009) and its political impartiality (Jasanoff, 2011). This double – scientific and political objectivity (Jasanoff, 2011) is achieved through various epistemic practices, which Daston and Galison (2007) described as ‘mechanistic objectivity’. The ‘epistemic virtue’ (Daston & Galison, 2007) of objectivity is achieved through adherence to the scientific criteria of methodological robustness.

Furthermore, the influence of experts on policymaking occurs via the production of specific ‘policy devices’ (Hirschman & Berman, 2014). As argued by Hirschman and Berman (2014), these devices include a ‘wide variety of sociotechnical tools that help policymakers see and make decisions about the world’ (Hirschman & Berman, 2014, p. 782). Such devices are robust due to the epistemic authority stemming from their perceived technical reliability and structure thinking about policy problems and harden the existing paradigms.

The second group of determinants of expertise entails an individual level of practices of experts involved in producing knowledge for policymaking. Production of knowledge that is expected to be both objective and policy-relevant is (as discussed above) somewhat paradoxical, raising expectations of both impartiality and engagement in the political process. This inherently paradoxical position can be mediated by approaching it in terms of practice, rather than epistemic content of policy knowledge. A now classic study of this approach is Hilgartner’s (2000) work on the work science advisory committees. In this work, Hilgartner argues that advisors engage in “social machinery of credibility” (Hilgartner, 2000, p. 146). Employing the dramaturgical metaphor (Goffman, 1956), Hilgartner argues that science advisors yield their credibility by separating the front stage – a seemingly objective and unified body of advice – from the backstage of knowledge production, which is more disordered and ideologically and epistemically pluralistic.

Therefore, experts achieve the epistemic gains of impartiality not by means of absolute departure from interests and values, but rather through careful “practices of objectivity” (Jasanoff, 2011). And these practices often go beyond pure ‘mechanistic objective’ and instead include what Daston and Galison (2007) call ‘trained judgement’. This type of activity involves analysis and pattern recognition of experts that is based not purely on following scientific methodology but rather depends on intuition and ‘unconscious judgement’ (Daston & Galison, 2007, p. 44).

The final – and arguably one that is the least explored in the existing literature entails institutional and organisational determinants for the scope and format of expertise. Karin Knorr-Cetina (2007,

p. 371) called for the exploration of not only knowledge production regimes but also so-called macro-epistemics: ‘concrete institutional arrangements for exchanging and processing information’. Such an exploration includes an institutional setting for knowledge production and dissemination (Liverani, Hawkins, & Parkhurst, 2013), positioning of experts within organisations (Hirschman & Berman, 2014) and institutional framings of problems (Djelic & Sahlin-Andresson, 2006).

### 3. METHODS

#### 3.1. Empirical setting

The first Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) to be realised is to “End poverty in all its forms everywhere”. The realisation of this goal set up in SDG 1 requires monitoring of the poverty levels through a variety of indicators (see: Box 1). A key development from the Millennium Development Goals is a requirement to disaggregate the collected data according to age (and gender), thus calling for an explicit measurement of childhood poverty. Childhood poverty, however, is not yet a well-established policy concept in all settings, leading to various challenges with its monitoring and measurement. The UNICEF Innocenti (2015) report even described the current situation as a ‘crisis in monitoring’, characterised by a multiplicity of different poverty measures, resulting in various calculated levels of poverty and accompanied by divergent ‘league tables’.

#### Box

1

#### Sustainable Development Goal 1:

#### “End Poverty in All Its Forms Everywhere”

**Target 1.1:** By 2030, eradicate extreme poverty for all people everywhere, currently measured as people living on less than \$1.25 a day.

**Indicator 1.1.1:** Proportion of population below the international poverty line, by sex, age, employment status and geographical location (urban/rural)

**Target 1.2:** By 2030, reduce at least by half the proportion of men, women and children of all ages living in poverty in all its dimensions according to national definitions

**Indicator 1.2.1:** Proportion of population living below the national poverty line, by sex and age.

**Indicator 1.2.2:** Proportion of men, women and children of all ages living in poverty in all its dimensions according to national definitions.

#### 3.2. World Bank – monetary poverty

## Poverty line

One of the key methods of poverty measurement and monitoring (in terms of assessing the progress towards minimising and – eventually (see: World Bank, 2018) – eradicating ‘extreme’ poverty. A key instrument here is a poverty line – a threshold of minimum income required for satisfying the basic standard of living (such as food, shelter, access to water, etc.). The poverty line approach (measured in Purchasing Power Parity – PPP) has been implemented in the World Bank since the 1990s with the occasional (in 2001, 2008 and 2015) reconsideration of where the purchasing power should lie (starting with 1\$ per day to 1.90\$ per day).

## Atkinson’s Commission

In 2016, against the backdrop of SDGs and a broader strategic goal of the World Bank to achieve a drop in the extreme poverty to 3%, WB invited Prof Atkinson to lead an external review of its approaches to poverty. The so-called Atkinson’s Commission was set to achieve two goals: 1.) to review the level of a poverty line; and 2.) to review alternative approaches to poverty measurement. (World Bank, 2018) The results of the Commission's work were published in the report: *Monitoring Global Poverty. A Report of the Commission on Global Poverty*. The Commission recommended alternative approaches to the poverty line: subjective assessments, basic needs, capabilities, and minimum rights. Furthermore, the Commission recommended the WB to track a broader variety of indicators of poverty and to introduce a multidimensional poverty measure. The World Bank started measuring the multidimensional poverty in their 2018 edition of *Poverty and Shared Prosperity Report*.

Furthermore, the Atkinson Commission’s report acknowledged that poverty amongst children and women should be monitored in a multidimensional way and data should be disaggregated and numbers of children and women living in poverty should be reported. The report quotes (one of its co-authors) Saunders:

“child poverty differs fundamentally from adult poverty not only in how it is experienced and the extent to which those affected can be regarded as being responsible for their plight but also in terms of its longer-term effects” (Saunders 2015, p. 9; quoted in the World Bank, 2016).

As highlighted in the Commission’s Report, moving towards a ‘dashboard approach’ of measuring multiple dimensions of poverty would require a collaboration between the World Bank and other IOs within the UN system. For example, such measures as access to education, health services or

nutrition which are currently carried out by other agencies should be in the future integrated into WB's portfolio of poverty measures.

### **3.3. UNICEF – multidimensional poverty**

UNICEF has been leading the debate over the insufficiency of monetary measures, particularly when it comes to childhood poverty and was the earliest adopter of multidimensional poverty measures.

#### **The Bristol Approach**

UNICEF adopted a multidimensional approach as early as 2004 in their *Global Study on Child's Poverty* using The Bristol Approach (developed by the University of Bristol) which adopted the dimensions of childhood poverty stemming from the Convention on the Rights of the Child. Seven dimensions of child poverty: education, health, nutrition, water, sanitation, shelter, information. Poverty is defined as deprivation in two or more areas.

#### **MODA – Multidimensional Overlapping Deprivation Analysis**

The newest approach – MODA<sup>2</sup> was developed in 2012, building on the Bristol Approach. The focus of this measure is on the overlapping areas of deprivation. Eight dimensions of deprivation: education, health, nutrition, water, sanitation, shelter, information, protection from violence.

The introduction of multidimensional measures disaggregated at the age level within the SDG1 has opened up an opportunity for UNICEF to lead the global multidimensional childhood poverty measurement (UNICEF, 2017) Consequently, UNICEF is planning on continuing its work towards global multidimensional poverty measurement reports (UNICEF, 2017).

### **3.4. Data sources (data collection and analysis is ongoing)**

The project employs a comparative case study methodology exploring (as described above) two key organisations responsible for poverty measurement at the international level – the World Bank and UNICEF.<sup>3</sup> The research is based on two main sources of data: interviews and document analysis. The interviews are semi-structured and follow a topic guide covering four main themes: approaches to measuring poverty, challenges and facilitators of poverty measurement,

---

<sup>2</sup> See: [https://www.unicef-irc.org/files/upload/documents/MODA\\_BROCHURE.pdf](https://www.unicef-irc.org/files/upload/documents/MODA_BROCHURE.pdf)

<sup>3</sup> The data collection is ongoing. The current draft is based on 15 interviews and 25 documents.

collaboration with partners and the role of measurement in poverty reduction. The interviews are being currently carried out with key experts within the organisations, including statisticians, economists and policy advisors at various levels of seniority. The document analysis is based on a number of strategic documents, including strategies, reports, working papers, briefing notes, guiding notes, etc. produced by the World Bank and UNICEF.

The collected data were transcribed and coded in NVivo. We have employed a grounded theory approach in which the data was analysed in multiple rounds of coding (including descriptive, focused and theoretical coding).

## 4. FINDINGS

### 4.1. Epistemic level – practices of objectivity

The methodological robustness of the poverty measures employed by both organisations was named by the vast majority of the interviewees as the key way in which the organisations gain traction. At the same time, the interviewees from both organisations differed in their perceptions of objectivity. The World Bank’s interviewees discussed the technical complexity and adherence to the established measurement guidelines as the central way of guaranteeing not only the validity of the process of producing metrics but also as ensuring the implementation of the measure. This type of framing is aligned with conceptualising objectivity as ‘view from nowhere’ (Jasanoff, 2011) – where knowledge is validated by being decontextualized. Hence, the claim to the authority of numbers (and consequently – their political capacity) lie in the adherence to strict rules of statistical and/or economic methodology. Therefore, the key discussion in the process over the measurement occur at the level of designing the measure. This was, for example, reflected in the ongoing debates among the experts in the World Bank over the correct levels of the poverty lines.

In contrast, the majority of interviewees from UNICEF discussed the methodological robustness as key but not only quality of the practices of data collection and analysis that was necessary for the correct measurement of poverty and decision-making based on the measures. The interviewees within the organisation considered the context in which the measures will be applied, for example, the existing forms of poverty measurement employed in countries, statistical capacity and appropriateness of the strategy in context. For example:

They’re [Policy Experts] going to get a glossy report with a “perfect” measurement of child poverty, which is going to have no relevance and is not going to be read by the appropriate government officials who have to do something about it. But they will check the box, and they will say we have a perfect measurement of

poverty, of child poverty. So their interest is: “get me a number, even if it’s an imperfect number”. And sometimes I joke with them, and I say look you don’t need a number, maybe you just need a five-minute video about the plight of poor children.” (UNICEF, Data Analyst)

The focus on consensus-building and generating local support for measuring poverty have implications for the conceptualisation of objectivity. In this context, objectivity was seen not as obtained purely on the basis of methodological robustness but also on the basis of fitness of to the context in which the measure is used. Therefore, the assessment of the measurement is not based purely on criteria of statistical robustness (‘view from nowhere’) but rather on buy-in from multiple stakeholders, agreeing on the measure (‘view from everywhere’ according to Jasanoff, 2011).

The divergent views on objectivity were reflected in the perception of the policy instruments (such as a poverty line or a multidimensional poverty measurement). The interviewees working in the World Bank, even while discussing the limitations of the poverty line, saw it as a potentially universal and de-contextualised form of measurement. UNICEF’s MODA on the other hand, even if perceived as the most appropriate measure to capture the reality of childhood poverty (thanks to its child-centric data collection), was not seen as absolutely necessary to be implemented across all countries. The interviewees acknowledged that the decisions regarding the measurement type should acknowledge contextual information, therefore inherently were not framed as universal.

#### **4.2. Expert level - strategic distance**

The interviewees acknowledged that methodological robustness of the measure did not guarantee the implementation of the measure (or consequent political action) at the country level. As summarised by one of the interviewees:

I think it’s the same with everything, all down to little bit of timing, luck, relationships. So you could have a really great policy brief that has no traction. Whereas you could have a really shitty one, but everything has aligned beautifully and it goes places. (UNICEF, Policy Adviser)

Sustaining a close relationship with policymakers while protecting one’s image of impartiality was challenging as the policymakers and experts had varying criteria of assessment of evidence (Bandola-Gill, forthcoming). Production of numbers that were at the same time politically effective

(in terms of guiding the decision-making) and methodologically robust required cautious navigation of the (epistemic and political) distance to policymakers (akin to Jasanoff, 1990, Hilgarten, 2000). For example, as explained by one of the interviewees:

[Another] thing is the political/diplomatic skill. Because you need to engage external counterparts to keep them abreast of what you're doing, to get their advice, to give them a heads up on what the numbers are going to be. To have the political intuition of which number might cause a problem with the government, so that you can alert the country office. The other one is you have to have the technical expertise to be able to handle the calculations of these things. My colleagues are recognised by their peers in academia outside of UNICEF as leaders. They don't just write this so-called bureaucratic report, they also publish in academic journals with cutting edge analysis and innovations. (UNICEF, Senior Analyst)

At the same time, the vast majority of interviewees acknowledged that combining these two types of skills mentioned by the interviewee above was not straightforward. The data collected for this study point to two main strategies for navigating the distance between producing numbers and political work the numbers ought to do: drawing inter-professional boundaries and separating stages of the policy process.

The first strategy entailed separating experts responsible for data analysis from experts responsible for writing recommendations based on the data. Within the process of producing reports, the particular statisticians and economists would work on analysing data in a methodologically robust way, hence creating the epistemic distance from the particular setting (akin to the notions of academic autonomy). Experts responsible for creating solution were on the other hand tasked with diminishing the distance between knowledge production and the local setting by mobilising their own judgement about the context and engaging various stakeholders: "if it [the report] is done really well then you would have like all the different ministries involved, and that they have drafted these policy recommendations together as a technical working group" (UNICEF, Policy Adviser). Through establishing intra-professional boundaries and separating groups of experts responsible for technical and political elements of measurement and advice, the IOs secured both the legitimacy and scientific credibility of reports.

The second strategy was more nuanced and required navigating the robustness of numbers with their relevance at a specific time and a persuasive power to influence decision-making. As exemplified by the following quote:

If you want to measure it for impact at the level of policy, anything could work, even a number that you just make up in the middle of the conversation to impress people. That's OK. But if you want to then monitor the impact of the policy you'd better have the best possible measure, not just a measure which is half cooked and not appropriate. Because that is when you are going to be then confused and thinking that you're making progress when you're not. (UNICEF, Senior Analyst)

Here, the interviewees differentiated between numbers used at the beginning of the policy process – aimed at persuasion and advocacy and numbers that were used at the evaluation stage – aimed at assessing the performance of policy programmes. By engaging in the process of compartmentalisation of these two types of number-making practices, the interviewed experts were able to benefit from producing knowledge that is directly applicable in policy context (Bandola-Gill, forthcoming) and being seen as producers 'usable knowledge' (Lindblom & Cohen, 1979) but at the same time being seen as producers of universal, academically excellent knowledge.

### 4.3. Organisational determinants of expertise

The final determinant of the scope and format of expertise in the global governance of poverty were the organisational epistemologies (or 'macro-epistemologies' – Knorr-Cetina, 2007). One of the key differences in the organisation-wide approaches to knowledge production and dissemination were the various levels of centralisation of knowledge structures. This could be illustrated by the two following quotes:

The difference between the World Bank and UNICEF is we're super decentralised, so whatever we decide here at HQ can be a nice guidance note, and it can be a learning experience and useful for [experts in country offices], but ultimately they decide how to do things. If you have a very strong representative who has a different opinion, then that's that. It's not like the World Bank where it's more clear directives. (UNICEF, Policy Advisor)

And:

You need a position - how we measure poverty for children, what is the guiding principle and we justify this principle, this is the measure that we propose. Whether it's MODA, MPIs, MPI plus, a modified MODA, a new blend of both, this is our method. The same way the Bank would go about and say when we measure monetary poverty using the international poverty line So that's the position of the Bank.

UNICEF doesn't have a position. UNICEF will say, all depending on the country, we go for MPI or we go for MODA (WB, Senior Analyst)

The varying levels of (de)centralisation of knowledge production machinery shaped different enactments of politics of knowledge practices. The centralisation of epistemic structures within the World Bank resulted in tensions surrounding 'closing down' the measures – establishing a common statistical framework and work towards implementation of the framework at the country levels. The organisation's measuring agenda was widely debated in terms of its methodological robustness but once the agreement was (mostly internally) reached and recommendations were endorsed, the accepted guidelines were seen as the dominant guides for carrying out the measurement process.

More decentralised models of policy expertise employed by UNICEF were targeted towards 'opening-up' the potential forms of measurement. Therefore, the centralised guidelines were designed to promote measurement in any form, rather than one specific measure. The interviewees based in UNICEF discussed their organisation as being epistemically open, with distributed agency of expert, where actors based on different levels (headquarters vs country-level) were able to endorse and implement different forms of measurement, depending on the contextualised information from the setting.

## 5. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS

This paper discussed an early stage of an exploration of politics and practices of expertise within the International Organisations. The work is still ongoing, however, some emerging findings discussed above point to three theoretical insights into the cultures of expertise in the global governance of poverty:

- 1.) Epistemic authority and legitimacy of experts are organisationally bounded and individually and epistemically mediated phenomena. Expertise in global governance is delineated by varying approaches to navigating the technical and political aspects of the production of numbers and knowledge dissemination.
- 2.) Therefore, this paper proposes a symbiotic model of expertise, in which political and technocratic modes of legitimacy are neither completely separated (the case of 'speaking truth to power' models) or entirely unified (as it was the case with new modes of knowledge production). Instead, the expert practice requires constant negotiation and navigation between these two logics.

- 3.) The notion of international expertise is characterised by its bounded portability. Various organisational epistemic structures enable forms of expertise that is either more advisory or deliberative.

## 6. BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Arnoldi, J. (2007). UNIVERSITIES AND THE PUBLIC RECOGNITION OF EXPERTISE. *Minerva*, 45(1), 49–61. <https://doi.org/10.1007/sl>
- Bandola-Gill, J. (forthcoming in *Science and Public Policy*) *Between Relevance and Excellence? Research Impact Agenda and the Production of Policy Knowledge*.
- Knorr-Cetina, K. (2007). Culture in global knowledge societies: knowledge cultures and epistemic cultures. *Interdisciplinary Science Reviews*, 32(4), 361–375. <https://doi.org/10.1179/030801807x163571>
- Daston, L., & Galison, P. (2007). *Objectivity*. (P. Galison, Ed.). New York : Cambridge, Mass.: New York : Zone Books.
- Desrosières, A. (2002). *The politics of large numbers: A history of statistical reasoning*. Harvard University Press.
- Djelic, M. L., & Sahlin-Andersson, K. (Eds.). (2006). *Transnational governance: Institutional dynamics of regulation*. Cambridge University Press.
- Epstein, S. (1995). The Construction of Lay Expertise: AIDS Activism and the Forging of Credibility in the Reform of Clinical Trials. *Science, Technology & Human Values*, 20(4), 408–437.
- Funtowicz, S. O., & Ravetz, J. R. (1993). Science for the post-normal age. *Futures*, 25(7), 739–755. [https://doi.org/10.1016/0016-3287\(93\)90022-L](https://doi.org/10.1016/0016-3287(93)90022-L)
- Gibbons, M., Limoges, C., Nowotny, H., Schwartzman, S., Scott, P., & Trow, M. (1994). *The New Production of Knowledge: The Dynamics of Science and Research in Contemporary Societies*. London: SAGE Publications.
- Goffman, E. (1956). *The presentation of self in everyday life*. Edinburgh: Edinburgh : University of Edinburgh, Social Sciences Research Centre.
- Grek, S. (2013). Expert moves: International comparative testing and the rise of expertocracy. *Journal of Education Policy*, 28(5), 695–709. <https://doi.org/10.1080/02680939.2012.758825>

- Grundmann, R. (2017). The problem of expertise in knowledge societies. *Minerva*, 55(1), 25–48.  
<https://doi.org/10.1007/s11024-016-9308-7>
- Haas, P. (2004). When does power listen to truth? A constructivist approach to the policy process. *Journal of European Public Policy*, 11(4), 569–592.  
<https://doi.org/10.1080/1350176042000248034>
- Hilgartner, S. (2000). *Science on stage : expert advice as public drama*. Stanford, Calif. : Stanford University Press.
- Hirschman, D., & Berman, E. P. (2014). Do economists make policies? On the political effects of economics. *Socio-Economic Review*, 12(4), 779-811.
- Jasanoff, S. (2003). Breaking the Waves in Science Studies: Comment on H.M. Collins and Robert Evans, 'The Third Wave of Science Studies'. *Social Studies of Science*, 33(3), 389–400.  
<https://doi.org/10.1177/03063127030333004>
- Jasanoff, S. (2005). Judgement under Siege: The Three–Body Problem of Expert Legitimacy. In S. Maasen & P. Weingart (Eds.), *Democratization of expertise? Exploring novel forms of scientific advice in political decision–making* (pp. 209–224). Dodrecht: Springer Netherlands.
- Jasanoff, S. (2011). The Practices of Objectivity in Regulatory Science. In C. Camic, N. Gross, & M. Lamont (Eds.), *Social Knowledge in the Making* (pp. 307–337). Chicago: Chicago University Press.
- Lindblom, C. E., & Cohen, D. K. (1979). *Usable knowledge: Social science and social problem solving* (Vol. 21). Yale University Press.
- Liverani, M., Hawkins, B., & Parkhurst, J. O. (2013). Political and Institutional Influences on the Use of Evidence in Public Health Policy. A Systematic Review. *PLoS ONE*, 8(10), e77404.  
<https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0077404>
- Montuschi, E. (2009). Questions of evidence in evidence-based policy. *Axiomathes*, 19(4), 425–439.  
<https://doi.org/10.1007/s10516-009-9085-0>
- Price, D. K. (1968). *The scientific estate*. London : Oxford University Press.
- Scheel, S., & Ustek-Spilda, F. (2019). The politics of expertise and ignorance in the field of migration management. *Environment and Planning D: Society and Space*.  
<https://doi.org/10.1177/0263775819843677>

Turner, S. P. (2010). Normal Accidents of Expertise. *Minerva*, 48(3), 239–258.  
<https://doi.org/10.1007/s11024-010-9153-z>

UNICEF (2015). *Measuring child poverty: New league tables of child poverty in the world's rich countries*. At [http://www.unicef-irc.org/publications/pdf/rc10\\_eng.pdf](http://www.unicef-irc.org/publications/pdf/rc10_eng.pdf) [20 October 2015].

Wildavsky, A. B. (1979). *Speaking truth to power: the art and craft of policy analysis*. Boston: Boston : Little, Brown.

World Bank (2016). Monitoring global poverty: Report of the commission on global poverty. *The World Bank, Washington, DC*.

World Bank (2018). Poverty and Shared Prosperity Report. *The World Bank, Washington, DC*.

Yearley, S. (2005). *Making Sense of Science: Understanding the Social Study of Science*. London: SAGE Publications.